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Declarations of Trusts and the
Statute of Uses
In Neal v. Bryant: plaintiff brought a statutory action to de-
termine and quiet title to a parcel of land known as the "Leazenby
land". Defendant claimed title as residuary devisee under the
will of plaintiff's father, Joseph Bryant. Testator had executed
the will under which defendant claimed on July 9, 1915, and had
acquired title to the land in suit on January 25, 1916. When tes-
tator obtained the land, he did not go into possession himself, but
put plaintiff in possession, telling plaintiff and other that the
land was not his but plaintiff's. At all times thereafter plaintiff
was possessed of the land. She asserted dominion over it just
as if she were an obsolute owner, rented some of it and used other
portions for her own benefit. In December, 1916, plaintiff wrote
to testator asking him to advance her some money, but he, by
letter, refused, stating: "I have given you the Leazenby land, and
it is yours forever for your own personal benefit, and I think
that is help enough now." Upon testator's death defendant
claimed the land and plaintiff thereupon brought this action.
Defendant had judgment in the circuit court but the Su-
preme Court of Missouri reversed this decision. It was held that
testator's letter to plaintiff was a declaration of trust, satisfying
the statute of frauds; that plaintiff had been invested by testa-
tor with the entire beneficial interest in the land; and that testator
merely held the legal title for the benefit of plaintiff.2 This being
the case, the court stated that, as the trust was passive, legal
title passed to plaintiff under the statute of uses and that defend-
ant gained nothing under the will. 3 Both points decided are im-
portant, interesting and worthy of full consideration.
1. (1921) 235 S. W. 1075.
2. 235 S. W. 1. c. 1077.
3. 235 S. W. 1. c. 1077.
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I.
DECLARATIONS OF TRUST
A promise unsupported by consideration to hold property in
trust for another is not a trust and is not binding. It is no part
of a contract; nor is it a present gift of either the legal title or
a beneficial interest in the property. The transaction dif-
fers in no material respect from other forms of promissory gifts
and, unless it be later executed, no rights become vested in the
intended beneficiary or donee. Equity, as a rule, just as much as
law insists upon the necessity of consideration to make a promise
binding and enforceable. 4  While the above is true, it does not
follow that an owner is unable to make a gift of the beneficial
interest in property, retaining himself the legal title in trust for
the donee. This can be done and the authorities hold that when
a donor expresses the intention to separate the legal title from
the beneficial interest and to keep the former, while presently giv-
ing the latter, a valid trust is raised, even though the element
of consideration is absent from the transaction. Whenever there
is an intention to thus finally dispose of the beneficial interest, the
gift is regarded as consummated and there is a valid and effectual
declaration of a trust. It is not essential that technical words be
used to bring about this result, but it should appear from what
is said and done that the donor intended to give at once and has
given the benefits to be derived from the property.'
4. Harding v. Trust Co. (1918) 276 Mo. 136, 207 S. W. 68, "Where
the gift is imperfect, a court of equity leaves the parties where it finds
them - -" Lane v. Ewing (1860) 31 Mo. 75, 86; Henderson's Administrator
v. Henderson (1855) 21 Mo. 379; Citizen's National Bank v. McKenna
(1912) 168 Mo. App. 254, 153 S. W. 521; Brannock v. Magoon (1910) 141
Mo. App. 316, 125 S. W. 535; Museum v. Zeller (1904) 108 Mo. App. 348,
83 S. W. 1021; Sinithwick v. Bank (1910) 95 Ark. 463, 130 S. W. 166;
Barnum v. Reed (1891) 136 II. 388, 26 N. E. 573; Bennett v. Littlefield
(1901) 77 Mass. 294, 58 N. E. 1011; Stone v. Russell (1858) 12 Gray
(Mass.) 266. See also Dexter v. Macdonald (1906) 196 Mo. 373, 95 S. W.
359; Pitts v. Weakley (1900) 155 Mo. 109, 55 S. W. 1055; Ex Parte Pye
(1811) 18 Ves. 140; Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) sec. 97; 3 Pomeroy, Equity
(4th ed.) sec. 996; Drosten v. Mueller (1890) 103 Mo. 624, 15 S. W. 967.
5. "But a settler possessed of the legal title may create a valid trust
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Holding a trust to exist under the suggested conditions seems
to be a sound decision. After all, the right to the beneficial use
of property is a kind of a title (although merely equitable in its
nature) and what more should be required to find a gift of such
an interest than a present intention on the part of the giver to
divest himself of all such interest therein and to vest the same
therein by a declaration that he holds the title in trust for the other per-
son. A transfer of the title is not necessary." Leeper v. Taylor (1892)
111 Mo. 312, 324, 19 S. W. 955. In Leeper's case the court held (111 Mo.
I. c. 324) that no consideration to support the trust was essential, but
indicated that consideration might have been found in the transaction as
it occurred. Moulden v. Train (1918) 199 Mo. App. 509, 204 S. W. 65;
Watson v. Payne (1910) 143 Mo. App. 721, 128 S. W. 238; Mize v. Bank
(1894) 60 Mo. App. 358; Schumacher v. Dolan (1912) 154 Ia. 207, 134
N. W. 624, citing and following Leeper v. Taylor, supra; Krandel's Exe-
cutor v. Krandel (1898) 104 Ky. 745, 47 S. W. 1084; Locke v. Farmers'
etc. Co. (1893) 140 N. Y. 135, 35 N. E. 578; Ray v. Simmons (1876) 11
R. I. 266. Lane v. Ewing (1860) 31 Mo. 75 expresses the same rule but
does not actually decide the point. In Northrip v. Bruge (1913) 255 Mo.
641, 164 S. W. 584 it was held on the facts that there was no declaration of
trust, but the court said (p. 654) : "Neither is it requisite to be the valdity
of such a trust (i. e. an express voluntary trust) that a third person
should be designated as trustee. For the settler may constitute himself
a trustee of a completed verbal trust of personal property * *." See
also Re Soulard (1897) 141 Mo. 642,43 S. W. 617; Knapp v. Knapp & Co.
(1895) 127 Mo. 53, 29 S. W. 885; Price v. Kane (1892) 112 Mo. 412, 20
S. W. 609; Woodford v. Stephens (1873) 51 Mo. 443; Taylor v. Welsh
(1912) 168 Mo. App. 223, 153 S. W. 490; Murray v. King (1911) 153 Mo.
App. 710, 135 S. W. 107; Goddard v. Conrad (1907) 125 Mo. App. 165, 101
S. W. 1108; Crowley v. Crowley (1908) 131 Mo. App. 178, 110 S. W. 1100.
In Zeidman v. Molasky (1906) 118 Mo. App. 106, 94 S. W. 754 de-
fendant persuaded plaintiff to come and work for him, promising to pay
her for such services as she might render. It was agreed that the de-
fendant should invest the amount of plaintiff's earnings and pay over the
amount of the investment on plaintiff's marriage. Defendant did not ac-
count at such time and plaintiff sued. The court held that there was an
express trust. The decision seems questionable. It does not appear that
defendant declared himself to be a trustee, but rather that he agreed to
set aside money as earned and to hold it in trust. There was not and
could not have been a present gift of a beneficial interest. The theory of
the decision is wrong, although the defendant probably should have been
held liable.
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in the beneficiary? If this intent exists and is clearly expressed,
the gift by way of trust should be complete and the rights vested
as desired. The statement should be taken as equivalent to a
grant of the intended interest.'
Suppose, however, that A owns land and attempts to convey
to B full and complete title by way of gift, but for one reason or
another his attempt fails and title does not pass. Should a court
6. "It has been decided that upon an agreement to transfer stock
the court will not interpose; but if the party has declared himself to be
a trustee of the stock it becomes the. property of the cestui que trust with-
out more, and the court will act upon it." Lord Edlon in Ex parte Pye,
supra, note 4, 18 Ves. I. c. 150.
Conceding that courts regard a declaration as sufficient to vest an
equitable interest in the beneficiary, still the trust will not be enforced un-
less the Statute of Frauds is compiled with. The statute does not make
a parol declaration invalid, but merely provides that a trust which touches
and concerns real estate cannot be proved except by a written memoran-
dum. In other words, the trust is good, even though the declaration be
oral, but the cestui can be put to written proof in an action to enforce the
same. The case under review stands for this proposition (235 S. W. I. c.
1076) and follows a long line of authority: Mugon v. Wheeler (1912) 241
Mo. 376, 145 S. W. 462; Thomson v. Thomson (1919) 211 S. W. (Mo.)
42; Crawley v. Crafton (1906) .193 Mo. 421, 91 S. W. 1027; Heil v. Heil
(1904) 184 Mo. 665, 84 S. W. 45; Phillips v. Hardenburg (1904) 181 Mo.
463, 80 S. W. 891; Mulock v. Mulock (1900) 156 Mo. 431, 57 S. W. 122;
Curd v. Brown (1898) 148 Mo. 82, 49 S. W. 990; Hillman v. Allen (1898)
145 Mo. 638, 47 S. W. 509; Pitts v. Weakley, supra, note 4 (dictum);
Rogers v. Ramey (1896) 137 Mo. 598, 39 S. W. 66; Price v. Kane (1892)
112 Mo. 412, 20 S. W. 609; Green v. Cates (1880) 73 Mo. 115; Woodford
v. Stephens (1873) 51 Mo. 443; Mansur v. Willard (1874) 57 Mo. 347;
Cornelius v. Smith (1874) 55 Mo. 528; Lane v. Ewing (1860) 31 Mo. 75
(dictum) ; Wolfskill v. Wells (1911) 154 Mo. App. 302, 134 S. W. 51;
Forest v. Rogers (1908) 128 Mo. App. 6, 106 S. W. 1105, (dictum).
The Statute of Frauds requires no written evidence of a declaration
of trust touching personal property. Wilhtuchter v. Miller (1918) 276 Mo.
322, 208 S. W. 39; Northrip v. Burge, supra, note 5, (dictum) ; Harris
etc.. Co. v. Miller (1905) 190 Mo. 640, 89 S. W. 629; Moulden v. Train,
supra, note 5, (dictum) ; Alexander v. Woodman, etc. (1916) 193 Mo. App.
411, 186 S. W. 2; Bank v. McKenna (1913) 168 Mo. App. 254, 153 S. W.
521 (dictum) ; Murray v. King (1911) 153 Mo. App. 710, 135 S. W. 107;
Ewing v. Parrish (1910) 148 Mo. App. 492, 128 S. W. 538; Crowley v.
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of equity construe the transaction, which purported to be a con-
veyance of the legal title, as a declaration of trust? Is it proper
to hold that because A desired to give all the title which he had
in the land to B, that he intended, failing in this, to give the bene-
ficial use to B and to retain the legal title himself ? The leading
case, perhaps, on this question is Richards v. Delbridge.7 There,
one D was a tenant of a mill and wished to give his interest in
the leasehold and the business which he conducted thereon to
plaintiff. To bring about this result, D endorsed on his lease,
dated, and signed the following memorandum: "This deed and
all thereto belonging I give to Edward Bennetto Richards from
this time forth, with all the stock in trade." The memorandum
did not serve as a legal assignment of the lease because the statute
required such an act to be done by deed, but plaintiff contended
that the memorandum was a declaration of trust and that he was
entitled to take as a cestui que trust. The court, however, held
that plaintff took nothing as there was neither an assignment nor
a declaration of trust. It was said, "for a man to make himself
a trustee, there must be an expression of an intention to become
a trustee, whereag words of present gift show an intention to
give over property to another, and not to retain it in the donor's
own hands for any purpose, fiduciary, or otherwise"." The court
also seemed to fear that a decision that D's memorandum created
a trust would establish a dangerous doctrine, "whereby every im-
Crowley (1908) 131 Mo. App. 178, 110 S. W. 1100; Carrol v. Woods (1908)
132 Mo. App. 492, 111 S. W. 885; Pitts v. Weakley, supra, (dictum);
Zeidman v. Molasky, supra, note 5; Huetteman v. Viesselmann (1892) 48
Mo. App. 582; Kramer v. McCaughey (1882) 11 Mo. App. 426. See contra,
but overruled by Harris etc. Co. v. Miller, supra, Mt. Calvary Church v.
Albers (1902) 174 Mo. 331, 73 S. W. 508; State ex rel v. Hawes (1903)
177 Mo. 360, 76 S. W. 653.
In Rogers v. Rogers (1885) 87 Mo. 257, there is a broad statement
that trusts in lands require no written evidence. The trust existed in that
cause because of fraud. Express trusts are within the Statute of Frauds
but resulting and constructive trusts are not. See Ferguson v. Robinson
(1914) 258 Mo. 113, 167 S. W. 447.
7. (1874) L. R. 18 Eq. 11.
8. L.R. 18Eq. 1.c. 15.
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perfect instrument (i. e. grant or assignment) would be made
effectual by being converted into a perfect trust"."
If a trust relationship is that which exists when a title is
vested in or retained by one for the benefit of another, 10 there
is no question as to the soundness of the decision in Richards'
case on this point." The donor in that case desired to part with
his entire interest in the property. The transaction contemplated
did not therefore resemble in any material way the creation of a
trust. If the donor had wished to do this, his desire would have
been to have kept the title and to have parted with only the right
to use the property. Theoretically, therefore, and on this narrow
basis the case is sound, and it is not surprising to find most courts
agreeing with the principles there laid down.' But while most
courts agree with this rule still, in some instances, imperfect gifts
have been turned into perfect trusts. The courts have done this
for the most part by not only finding an intention on the part of
9. L. R. 18 Eq.. 1. c. 15. Two earlier cases, Richardson v. Richard-
son (1867) L. R. 3 Eq. 686 and Morgan v. Malleson (1870) L. R. 10. Eq.
475, had been decided under similar circumstances for the donee, but Jes-
sel, M. R. in Richards' case refused to follow this authority.
10. See Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) sec. 1. The definition, for present
purposes, is accurate enough and generally accepted.
11. Possibly the donor's intentions might have been carried out on
another theory. As to this see infra note 14 and text in connection there-
with.
12. Northrip v. Burge, supra, note 5 (dictum) : "If a settlement has
failed for want of a sufficient conveyance when made, a court of equity
has no authority to supply that defect by ordering a conveyance, or con-
vert the imperfect settlement or gift into a declaration of trust merely
on account of some imperfection. As the donor left the transaction so
will the court leave it." Goodman v. Crowley (1900) 161 Mo. 657, 663,
61 S. W. 850 (dictum) ; Knapp v. Knapp & Co., supra, note 5 (dictum) ;
Lane v. Ewing, supra, note 4 (dictum) ; Bank v. McKenna, (supra) note
6; "Equity does not lend assistance to voluntary dispositions of property
while they are yet executory. If such dispositions are attempted in a
mode which fails for want of compliance with some indispensable rule of
law, they will not be carried into effect in another mode to which the rule
may not be essential. For example, if a gift is attempted without a com-
plete delivery of the property meant to be given, the intention to give will
be frustrated, and a court of equity will decline to treat the transaction
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the donor to ultimately give the legal title, but also an intention
to give presently and in every event (and not merely as one of
the consequences of a legal conveyance, or assignment) the bene-
ficial interest in the property. Perhaps sometimes the facts have
justified such a finding, but it is felt that other times they have
not, and that some courts, while protesting to the contrary, have
actually changed a transaction, which fell short of passing a legal
title and was not intended to accomplish any other purpose, into
a completed declaration of trust.
This seems to be true in Neal v. Bryant. The testator there
said that he had given 13 the land to plaintiff but he had not
actually done so. He considered the matter closed; that the land
belonged to plaintiff; and that he had no further responsibility
whatever. He thought as a result of what he had done plaintiff
was the full owner of the land; not that she had certain beneficial
interests therein by virtue of his having assumed certain obliga-
tions toward her with respect to a title retained by him. The
case does not appear to be distinguishable from Richards' case
and it is believed that no real trust was established.13a
While the writer has ventured to question the soundness of
the decision under review on the ground that there was no valid
declaration of trust, he does not believe that the result of the
as equivalent to a declaration by the would be donor to hold the property
in trust for the donee." Goode, J., in Pennell v. Ennis (1907) 126 Mo. App.
355, 360, 103 S. W. 147 (dictum) ; Godard v. Conran (1907) 125 Mo. App.
165, 101 S. W. 1108. See also Brannock v. Magoon, supra, note 4. The
cases in other jurisdictions are generally accord.- See 3 Pomeroy, Equity,
sec. 997, where the authorieties are collected.
13. 235 S. W. I. c. 1076.
13a. The court in deciding that there was an executed trust in Neal
v. Bryant, cited Watson v. Payne, supra, note 5. There the alleged trustee
being the grandfather of plaintiffs saved plaintiffs' mother's property from
being lost through a sale to satisfy her debts. The grandfather converted
the property into cash and stated that he held the cash less the amount of
his expense for the benefit of plaintiffs. The Kansas City Court of Ap-
peals held this constituted a declaration of trust. The trustee in that
case stated with respect to the property (143 Mo. App. I. c. 726) as fol-
lows: "I got it all wound up in good shape, and I am going to take care
of it - - - for the Page heirs - - - they are my grandchildren." It is sub-
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decision is necessarily wrong or undesirable. Perhaps in a case
of this kind, the donor, or those standing in his shoes, other than
bona fide purchasers, should be required to convey or assign the
legal title as intended to the so-called donee. It is believed that
such a holding could be made without deciding that there was a
trust. There will be found scattered through the cases a principle
by means of which, quite frequently, a futile effort to bring about
a legal result will be regarded as effective-as if the desired end
had been accomplished and attained. Sometimes this doctrine
finds its application in a decree for specific performance. Occa-
sionally it is applied through what we, for want of a better name,
call an estoppel. The doctrine is applied in cases where it would
be unjust or inflict injury on an innocent party if the contemplated
and intended legal result were not either decreed or regarded as
having been brought to pass.
A vendor makes an oral agreement to convey land. The
vendee goes into possession. The vendor will not be heard to
say that the agreement is not binding. The arrangement was
thought to be legally effective and will be so decreed. 14 A bor-
rows money from B and purports to give a mortgage to secure
the debt. The mortgage is defective as a legal conveyance. Yet
equity will construe the transaction as a contract to give a mort-
mitted that there is a real distinction between a statement that one has
given and a statement that one holds property for another. The first
statement does not contemplate a retention of legal title for the benefit
of another while the second does, and hence, amounts to a trust. In
another portion of the evidence in Payne's case the trustee was said to
have stated: "They (i. e. plaintiffs) are my grandchildren, and I am going
to see that they get it, and after they become of age, why I will pay it
over to them." This last statement was not a declaration of trust. If
the decision were based on this evidence alone there would not appear to
have been a trust. The statement first quoted, however, amounted to a
clear and unequivocal declaration of trust. The decision was therefore
proper and the case is distinguishable from the principal case.
14. Young v. Montgomery (1859) 28 Mo. 604; Butcher v. Stapley
(1865) 1 Vernon 363. Miller v. Lorentz (184) 39 W. Va. 160, 19 S. E. 391,
contains a clear discussion of the reasons for the rule and is worth read-
ing.
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gage and decree the desired legal result."5 A promises to give
B a parcel of land. The promise is unsupported by consideration
and is not legally binding. Still, in some instances, if B believes
the promise to be obligatory and acts upon it, B may require a
conveyance from A. It is just that B's expectations should be
realized.1" A group of individuals in good faith attempt to in-
corporate. There is less than substantial compliance with the
terms of the incorporation law. No one, save the state, will be
permited to assert that the association has not attained legal in-
corporation. It would be unjust to attribute any other effect to
the honest efforts of the associates.17  In each of the foregoing
illustrations the intended legal consequence was brought to pass
(although it did not actually occur) because it was deemed proper
and just to do so.
If A says to B, "I hereby give you my farm," and puts B
into possession, there may be no impelling reason to prevent a
court from requiring A to make good his expression of gift and
decreeing a conveyance. The parties believed that there had been
an effective gift. It is not so certain, if the evidence is clear and
unequivocal, that B would be unreasonable in thinking that he
had a right to the farm or that it would be just to deprive him of
the expected gift.
In the case under review there is a great deal to be said in
favor of plaintiff's contention that she had a right to the "Lea-
zenby land". Testator desired to give it to her and thought that he
had done so. She had acted on his representations more or less
to her detriment. It might not be unreasonable to hold that she
had a specifically enforceable equity, entitling her to a convey-
15. Hamilton Trust Co. v. Clemes (1900) 163 N. Y. 423, 57 N. E.
614; Sprague v. Cochrane (1894) 144 N. Y. 104, 38 N. E. 1000. See also
Holroyd v. Marshall ('1861) 10 H. L. C. 191.
16. West v. Bundy (1883) 78 Mo. 407; Dozier v. Matson (1887) 94
Mo. 328, 7 S. W. 268; Seavey v. Drake (1882) 62 N. H. 393.
17. Finch v. Ullman (1891) 105 Mo. 255, 16 S. W. 863; Granby etc.
Co. v. Richards (1888) 95 Mo. 106, 8 S. W. 246; Society Perun v. Cleve-
land (1885) 43 Ohio. St. 481.
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ance. Her right, however, should be predicated on this kind of an
equity and not upon a non-existing declaration of trust.
Of course, it could be said in answer to the above sugges-
tion that the law required certain formalities to perfect a pas-
sage of legal title. This is true. Law has often set up technical
conditions and requirements, only to find equity brushing them
aside and circumventing them. A possible answer to any such
contention as this is the doctrine of part performance and the
statute of frauds 18 and the specific execution of promissory gifts.
Equity has sometimes proceeded in the "very teeth" of legal pro-
visions, nullifying them because of the supposed existence of spe-
cial and peculiar equities in the case under consideration. Per-
haps the rules of law concerning gifts of property are sometimes
too strict. Perhaps rigid compliance with them should not always
be required. It is apparent that some courts feel this way about
them. Otherwise there would not be more or less continuous ef-
fort to construe imperfect gifts as trusts.'sa But, as has already
been said, the attempted gift is not believed to be a trust and should
be enforced if at all upon some other principles.
Suppose that A has a fund in a bank and desires B to have
it in the event of his death; that A takes out a certificate of de-
18. See, supra, note 14.
19. See, supra, note 16.
19a. "The rule of law that delivery is essential to a gift, and also
the rules as to what constitute delivery, have been rather strictly adhered
to in equity, thereby defeating occasionally the plain purpose of donors.
To avoid this result courts have found now and then that the real pur-
pose was to settle the property in trust in favor of the alleged donee in-
stead of to give to him outright." Goode, J., in Pennell v. Ellis, supra, note
12, 126 Mo. App. 1. c. 361 (dictum). For other cases in accord with the
holding in the case under review where the facts were similar see: Mor-
gan v. Malleson (1870) L. R. 10 Eq. 475; Richardson v. Richardson (1867)
L. R. 3 Eq. 686; Lynch v. Rooney (1896) 112 Cal. 279, 44 Pac. 565; Rache
v. George's Executor (1893) 93 Ky. 609, 20 S. W. 1039; Barkley v. Lane's
Executor (1869) 6 Bush (Ky.) 587. But see Harding v. Trust Co., supra,
note 4. In Goodman v. Crowley, supra, note 12 A stated that she was
buying land for B. After the purchase A stated that B was "running it
now"; that those who wished to rent must see B. It was stated by way
of dictum that there was no trust and that the gift would not be perfected.
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posit and endorses it to B but does not deliver; that A states
to B that the fund is B's on A's death; but that until then he (A)
wants the interest on the money and the control of the fund.
Should B, if he survive A, be entitled to the money? It has been
held on substantially these facts in Harris Banking Co. v. Miller
that B is entitled to the money as a cestui que trust.2" It was said
that A set aside the fund for B and by so doing constituted him-
self a trustee.20 a The only difference between the Harris case
and Neal v. Bryant is that in the former the donor attempted to
presently give a right to enjoy on his death ( a thing which cannot
be done at law without delivery 21) while in the latter the donor
attempted to presently give a right to enjoy from the date of the
atempted gift (a matter equally impossible at law without de-
livery).
There would seem to be no reason why the gift in either case
should not be upheld upon the equitable principles above suggested
unless there is a policy against its sustention. None is perceived
in the case of the attempted and established gift inter vivos. But
where the gift is to become effective, or it is attempted to establish
it after the death of the donor, the case is not so clear. In the
case where it is to take effect for the first time after the donor's
death, the question might well be asked, should a man be able to
give his property away in this manner except by a duly executed
and published will? Is there not a policy firmly established in the
law against such dispositions ?22 In the second case, namely,
where it is sought to establish a prior gift after the death of the
20. (1905) 190 Mo. 640, 89 S. W. 629.
20a. The evidence showed that the deceased stated to the intended
donee: "Now that is yours (meaning the certificate of deposit) but I
want the use of it while I live." 190 Mo. I. c. 658. But most of deceased's
statements were expressive of an intention to give when he died.
21. 190 Mo. I. c. 662, et seq. The cases all concede this proposition.
22. "The danger is great if such an attempt were to succeed; because
then the result of such a transaction as this would be, that the solemn
disposition of property which the law requires to be made in the shape
of a will, would be entirely lost sight of, because this would be as good a
disposition, or perhaps better than any will which could be made." War-
riner v. Rogers (1873) L. R. 16 Eq. 1. c. 353.
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donor, there is a difficulty of much the same kind. It is relatively
easy to manufacture evidence showing a gift after the donor is
gone and cannot present his own evidence to the contrary. Ap-
parently, however, some courts are not disposed to regard either
of the above suggestions as controlling. At least, such transac-
tions are being sustained from time to time as trusts. 23 If the
courts have decided on this policy, there seems to be no obstacle
to holding that the intended donee has a right to a conveyance or
assignment.
II.
THE STATUTE OF USES AND PASSIVE TRUSTS
In Neal v. Bryant the court held that the trust was passive
and for this reason the statute of uses put a title in plaintiff, the
cestui que trust.24 The case raises the question of the effect of
the statute of uses on inactive trusts, that is, on trusts where no
active duty in connection with the administration of the trust is
imposed on the trustee. The statute was originally enacted in
1536 by the British Parliament 25 and was probably regarded as a
part of the common law in the original English settlements in
this country.2 6 It was passed by the legislature of Missouri in
substantially its original form in 182527 but was perhaps in force
here from 1816. At that time a statute was adopted providing
that the common law of England and appropriate statutes of the
British Parliament, enacted prior to the fourth year of James I,
should be the law of the land.28 The meaning and purpose of the
23. See Both v. Oakland etc. Bank (1898) 122 Cal. 19, 54 Pac. 370;
Roche v. George's Executor, and Barkley v. Lane's Executor, supra, note
19a.
24. (1921) 235 S. W. 1. c. 1077.
25. 27 Henry VIII, c. 10.
26. Horton v. Sledge (1856) 29 Ala. 478; 1 Perry, Trusts sec. 299.
See also Guest v. Farley (1853) 19 Mo. 147.
27. R. S. 1825, p. 215, now sec. 2262, R. S. 1919.
28. 1 Mo. Ter. Law 436; Guest v. Farley, supra, note 26. See also
Hudson, Land Tenure in Missouri, 8 Law Ser. Mo. Bul. 1. c. 8 et seq.
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Missouri statute has been regarded as the same as that of the
English statute and it has been construed in the same way.29
At the time of the adoption of the original statute in England,
trusts in land as they exist and are understood today were not
known to the law. There were, however, certain equitable inter-
ests in land which could be created and were sanctioned on equit-
able principles. A, having a legal title, could convey it to B to the
use of C. C would have the right to enjoy the property without
the legal title according to the use.30 Also, A could, instead of
conveying land to B, bargain and sell to the use of C with the same
result.81 In the last case the use would be effectively raised with-
out transmutation of the legal title. There was considerable hos-
tility to the use in land 2 and the main purpose of the statute was
to destroy these interests, not by entirely abolishing them, but
by converting the right of the beneficiary, whenever created, into
a corresponding legal title.
To this end the statute provided in substance that whenever
one stood seised of land to the use of another, the beneficiary
should be vested with the legal title corresponding to the quantum
of interest that he had by way of use.33 For example, if A, hav-
ing a fee simple, bargained and sold a use to C for C's life, the
statute would give to C a legal life estate, and A would have a
legal reversion. 4 The result of the statute, accordingly, was that
the "use was transformed into a legal estate of the same size as
29. Cornwell v. Wulff (1898) 148 Mo. 542, 550, 50 S. W. 439; Pugh
v. Hayes (1893) 113 Mo. 424, 21 S. W. 23; Guest v. Farley, supra, note 26.
30. 1 Tiffany, Real Property (2nd ed.) sec. 97; Bigelow, Introduc-
tion, Law of Real Property, 68 et seq. It should be noted also that where
A enfeoffed B, B paying no consideration therefor, there was a use re-
sulting to A. Tiffany, supra, sec. 97.
311. Tiffany, op. cit. sec. 97; Bigelow, op. cit. p. 70. See also Guest v.
Farley, supra, note 26; Farrar v. Christy's Adm'rs. (1857) 24 Mo. 453.
32. The preamble to the English statute recites some "inconveniences"
resulting from the existence of uses, such as uncertainty of title, loss of
dower and curtesy, and loss to the crown of certain feudal incidents.
33. See, supra, note 25.
34. Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 99; Lutwich v. Mitton (1620) Cro.
Jac. 604.
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the use estate, the legal title of that amount being carried from
the holder of the legal title to the holder of the equitable title, by
operation of the statute".85  But an equitable title could be carved
out of an estate for years and would be sustained as such, because
the statute was only operative where one stood seised for the use
of another. Ownership of an estate for years does not carry the
seisin.3 Obviously, also, equitable interests in chattels personal
could be created without being touched by the statute. 31a
In certain instances there was a real need for equitable inter-
ests in land. Equity, being very much alive to this fact, soon
began to strain in every way to bring it about that an owner could
vest the beneficial ownership of land in one person, while granting
to another or retaining in himself the legal freehold title. As a re-
sult of this effort, two exception to the operation of the statute
of uses were developed. It was said that where an active duty
was imposed upon the party seised for the benefit of another, the
duty being in connection with the administration of the use, the
statute was not applicable. In such cases the use was not con-
verted into a legal title but was sustained as such.3 7 However,
35. Bigelow, Introduction, Law of Real Property, 75.
36. Slevlin v. Brown (1862) 32 Mo. 176; Ramsay v. Marsh (1882)
2 McCord (S. C.) 252.
36a. Fisher v. Fisher (1920) 203 Mo. App. 45, 217 S. W. 845. In
Webb v. Hayden (1901) 166 Mo. 39, 65 S. W. 760 and in Newton v. Reben-
ack (1901) 90 Mo. App. 656, the courts seemed to be under the impression
that the statute did operate on equitable interests in chattels; but the
opinion in each instance went off on another point. See, infra, note 37.
But see Bogert, Trusts, p. 156.
37. Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 102; 3 Pomeroy, Equity sec. 984;
Shiffman v. Schmidt (1900) 154 Mo. 204; 55 S. W. 451; Simpson v.
Erisner (1899) 155 Mo. 157, 55 S. W. 1029; Walton v. Ketchum (1898)
147 Mo. 209, 48 S. W. 924; Pugh v. Hayes (1893) 113 Mo. 424, 21 S. W.
23; Baker v. Nall (1875) 59 Mo. 265; Walter v. Walter (1871) 48 Mo.
140; Schoeneich v. Field (1897) 73 Mo. App. 452. See also Webb v. Hay-
den and Newton v. Rebenack, supra, note 36a; Meachem v. Steele (1879)
93 Ill. 135, 145.
On the other hand, it is well established that the statute does change
a passive use into a legal title. See, supra, note 35 and text in connection
therewith. See also, accord, Blumenthal v. Blumenthal (1913) 251 Mo.
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whenever the duties were finally performed and use became pas-
sive the statute would apply and from that time on the interest of
the cestui que use became legal3 7 a Finally, it was held that if an
owner created a use upon a use, the statute would only affect the
first use and serve to vest title in the first cestui que use. The
second use would remain as a use and the second beneficiary
would would have only an equitable interest in the property.38
693, 158 S. W. 648; Glasgow v. Mo. etc Co. (1910) 229 Mo. 585, 129 S. W.
900; Jones v. Jones (1909) 223 Mo. 424, 123 S. W. 29; Carter v. Long
(1904) 181 Mo. 701, 81 S. W. 162; Ottomeyer v. Pritchett (1903) 178 Mo.
160, 77 S. W. 62; O'Brien v. Ash (1902) 169 Mo. 283, 69 S. W. 8; Walton
v. Drumtra (1899) 152 Mo. 489, 54 S. W. 233; Cornwell v. Wulff (1898)
148 Mo. 542, 50 S. W. 439; Pitts v. Sheriff (1892) 108 Mo. 110, 18 S. W.
1071; Roberts v. Mosely (1873) 51 Mo. 282.
37a. Glasgow v. Mo. etc. Co., O'Brien v. Ash, Roberts v. Mosely,
supra, note 37. See also Perry, Trusts sec. 320 (p. 540).
In DeLa.shmutt v. Tcetor (1914) 261 Mo. 412, 169 S. W. 34 there was
a trust to convey. The 'court held that when the time for a conveyance,
according to the terms of the trust, arrived, the statute would make the
conveyance, and a grant by the trustee would be a work of "superreroga-
tion". Sed quf Was the trust or use passive? The duty of conveying
was imposed on the trustee. This had led some courts to rule that title
would not pass automatically to the beneficiary. See contra to Teetor's
case, Read v. Power (1878) 12 R. I. 16; Ayer v. Ritter (1888) 29 S. C.
135. But it is believed that requiring a conveyance when the sole duty
of the trustee is to convey is unduly technical. Under such conditions the
trust might well be regarded as passive and the statute of uses as oper-
ative.
38. Tiffany, Real Property, 359; 3 Pomeroy, Equity, sec. 985; Guest
v. Farley (1853) 19 Mo. 147. It was held in Doe v. Passingham (1827)
6 B. & C. 305 that if A made a legal conveyance to B's own use to the use
of C that a trust would be raised; that there was a use upon a use. Of
course in reality there was only one use, and the title should have been
carried to C (the first cestui que use) with the aid of the statute.
In Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, supra, note 37, a grantor, "granted bar-
gained and sold" in trust, the trust being passive. The court held (251
Mo. I. c. 703) that no duty was imposed upon the trustee and that there-
fore "title passed through him like water through a sieve and became im-
mediately vested in the parties of the third part (i. e. the beneficiaries)
under the statute of uses, - - -. " The court gives the matter no detailed
consideration, but it would appear that the grant to the trustees must
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BAR BULLETIN
Under the last mentioned rule, if A bargained and sold a u ,e to
B to the use of C, or if he conveyed to T to the use of B to the use
of C, the result in either case would be that B would have the
legal title. C's interest would be equitable as in the old days be-
fore the passage of the statute. The above described equitable
interests in land have survived and escaped the statute and have
existed until this time under the name of trusts. It would seem
then that the statute of uses does not affect trusts in land. They
are interests which have escaped from the statute.
Under the interpretation of the courts the statute is not aimed
to affect real trusts in any way but its purpose is to kill all equit-
have been considered not as operating to convey a title by way of use, but
rather as serving to pass legal title directly to the trustee under sec. 2787
R. S. 1909 (now sec. 2174 R, S. 1919). It has been shown that the statute
of uses does not affect in any way uses upon uses. Unless the conveyance
in Blumenthal's case was a legal grant, there was a use upon a use and
title would not have passed through the trustee to the cestuis. See, supra,
Guest v. Farley.
The writer wonders whether at this time in view of the provisions of
sec. 2174, R. S. 1919, it is possible to raise a use without transmutation of
possession (i. e. by bargain and sale or covenant to stand seised) ? That
section of the statute provides that a legal conveyance of land may be
made by deed "without any other act or ceremony". If A bargains and
sells to B or to the use of B, or if he covenants to stand seised to the use
of B, will not the court hold that such a written instrument will serve to
pass a legal title and not merely a use? There may be some question in
the case of the covenant to stand seised. Section 2180, R. S. 1919 pro-
vides for the words "grant, bargain and sell" as the technical words in a
legal conveyance implying covenants for title. It would seem as if a
court would be practically compelled to regard a deed of bargain and
sale as operating to convey a legal title and not to raise a use.
It is interesting to note in this connection Abbott v. Holloway (1881)
72 Me. 298. There a conveyance could have operated as either a bargain
and sale of a use or a covenant to stand seised; yet the court held that it
would operate to convey a legal title under the conveyancing statute. That
statute provided that "a person - - - may convey - - - by a deed to be
acknowledged - - '.' (72 Me. 1. c. 302. See also O'Day v. Meadows (1905)
194 Mo. 588 1. c. 621, 92 S. W. 637, 112 Am. St. Rep. 542.
In 3 Pomeroy, Equity, p. 2140 (note) the learned author in discussing
this question says: "By modern stautes in many, if not most slates, deeds
of land operate as grants to convey the entire legal estate and seisin by
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able interests in land other than trusts. It is therefore technically
incorrect to speak of the statute as operating on actual trusts.
Lut if we mean by a trust the old use in land, and perhaps any
other equitable interest similar in its nature to the old use, it will
be proper to say that the statute will execute it, if it is passive or
whenever it becomes passive.
For some time after the enactment of the statute of uses no
equitable interests in land existed except the trusts heretofore
enumerated. In the course of time, however ,new interests of
this nature were devised and created. In 1565 a covenant to
stand seised to the use of another was sustained in Sharington v.
Strotlon.asa Still later a declaration of trust was sustained.3 9 Now
while these transactions raised equitable interests, if anything,
they were not uses which were recognized at the time of the adop-
tion of the statute. W\hat should the court have done with such
interests ? Should it have said that the interests were within the
neaning of the statute and affected thereby unless active? Or
should it have held that the statute was intended to be limited in
its operation to only those uses in land which were known and
recognized at the time of its adoption? It would not have been
surprising to have found the courts adopting the latter interpre-
tation and narrowing as much as possible the statute's field of
of activity. This was not done. Instead, we find the court deal-
ing with the case of a covenant to stand seised as if a use had
been raised, holding that the covenantee's interest was converted
into a legal title.40 Placing a narrow construction on the statute
did not seem to occur to the court. It held as a matter of course.
force of the words transfer, --- and it is a misapprehension, in the face
of such legislation, to regard any deeds in these states as transferring the
legal estate by virtue of the statute of uses. To say, therefore, in most
of our states that a deed of bargain and sale raises a use which the statute
of uses executes, and that where a use or trust is expressly limited by a
deed of bargain and sale, it is not executed by the statute, are, as it
seems to me, wholly incosistent with the simplicity of the law as now
established by statute throughout the larger part of the United States."
38a. Plowd. 298.
39. See, supra, note 5 and text in connection therewith.
40. Sharington v. Strotton, supra, note 380.
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once it was determined that the covenant to stand seised raised
an equitable interest, that such interest was a use and was executed.
Sharrington v. Strotten4l was'an early authority allowing the
courts to interpret the statute as acting not only upon uses in land
as they existed at the time of the original statute, but also on all
other equitable interests in land created, after the statute, which
have the essential elements of a passive use, as such an interest
was at that time understood. Such a ruling would seem to be
right. The reason back of the adoption of the statute was a policy
against upholding a situation which resembled the old use. The
policy opposed a separation of the legal freehold title and the
beneficial use therein, unless there were active duties thrust on
the legal owner in connection with the administration of the use.
It should make no difference when such a transaction first arose.
The policy, if there is any justification for its assertion, should
be applied uniformly whenever the state of facts to which it is
applicable presents itself. For these reasons the rule in Neal v.
Bryant is sound.4 2
The problem still remains as to what should occur in the case
of a real trust which is passive. Suppose that A bargains and
sells land to the use of B and his heirs in trust, nevertheless, to
41. Supra, note 38a.
42. The statute of uses has been applied to devises in Missouri and
a title held vested in the beneficiary, Carter v. Long, supra, note 37. The
statute of uses, however, was passed before the statute of wills and was
originally therefore not applicable to devises in trust. The English deci-
sions would hold today that the statute did apply on the ground that the
testator intended the devise to be within the operation of the statute.
-- It has been settled that a gift to trustees in trust to permit a man to
take the rents during his life does not give the legal estate to the trustees
without more. It has been treated as analogous to an executed use, not
on the ground that the statute of uses directly applies to wills, because
the statute was passed before the statute of devises, but upon this ground,
that the will showed an intention that the same rules which the statute of
uses made applicable to settlements of real estate should be applied to
the gifts or devises of wills. It was therefore an index of intention and
nothing more. - - - On the same principle when a man gave real estate
to the use of A upon trust for B, it was held that A took the legal estate,
the language of conveyancers in settlements to which the statute of uses
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pay the rents and profits to C during C's life. If the deed of
bargain and sale does not operate under a modern conveyancing
statute to convey a legal estate to B,' 3 B will be a trustee. He is
the first cestui que use who acquires a title with the aid of the sta-
tute of uses. C will be a cestui que trust whose interest is simply
equitable in its nature. 4  What quantum of estate will B get?
What will happen to the legal title at C's death when the trust
will be fully accomplished? If the words of the grant were taken
literally, B would gain with the aid of the statute of uses a fee
simple and on C's death, even though the trust were terminated,
B would still have the legal title. It is certain that in this case the
statute of uses will not aid to divest B of the title because it ex-
hausted itself in executing B's use at the trust's inception." The
courts have for the most part avoided this consequence by holding
that B took as trustee merely an estate for the life of C. It is
said that while A conveyed a fee to B, still he could not have in-
tended that B should acquire an estate of any greater duration
than would be essential for carrying out and administering the
trust.4 6 The same rule usually should be adopted and applied in
applies being so used in the will as to amount to an expression of inten-
tion that the same mode of constructions should be adopted." Jessel,
M. R. in Baker v. White (1875) 20 Eq. 1. c. 171. See also Re Tanqueray-
Willaume (1881) 20 Ch. Div. 465.
43. See, supra, note 38, where it is suggested that deeds of bargain
and sale will probably operate today as legal conveyances and not to raise
uses.
44. See, supra, note 38 and text in connection therewith.
45. See, supra, note 38.
46. McBrayer v. Cariker (1879) 64 Ala. 50; West v. Fitz (1884) 109
Ill. 425; Young v. Bradley (1879) 101 U. S. 782, 25 L. Ed. 1044. See also
Cleveland v. Hallett (1850) 6 Cush. (Mass.) 403 and Gibson v. Montfort
(1750) 1 Ves. sr. 485; Bogert, Trusts, p. 566; Perry, Trusts, sec. 312. In
this connection, it is interesting to note, that if the trust requires for
its due execution a larger legal estate than that granted to the trustees, the
courts will by implication increase the quantum of title given. Perry,
Trusts, sec. 312. See also, accord, Cleveland v. Hallett and Gibson v.
Montfort, supra.
The English decisions have been more conservative in adjusting the
title of the trustee to meet the needs of the trust. It has been held that
if by a deed an estate of inheritance is given to the trustees that it will
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the cases of trusts of chattels real and personal.4  So, in this
class of cases very generally it is not possible for the trustee to
keep the title to the trust property after the ending of the trust.
A title for such a period of time is said to be all that was given
to the trustee. After the trust is terminated the legal title passes
on to those beneficially interested in the trust res.
Terminating the trustee's title with the accomplishment of
the trust probably does carry out in most instances the intention
of the creator of the trust. In any event such a contsruction of
the transaction is desirable. If the trustee's sole function is to
hold the title for another and at another's command, he serves no
useful purpose. It is better, if possible, to place the title in the
party having the exclusive beneficial interest. Naturally, how-
ever, this construction often has the effect of nullifying technical
words of limitation. It cuts down, for example, in the case sup-
posed a clearly conveyed fee to a life estate. In the case of a
trust in land, however, no other possible objection to the applica-
tion of the rule is seen. This is not a serious one.
When it comes to a trust of a leasehold estate or of chattels
personal possibly there are some further technical objections in
the way of such a construction. There is authority holding that
there can be no reversion following a grant of a life interest in
a chattel either real or personal.48 It has been stated that if A
grants to B a life interest out of a leasehold or a chattel personal,
B has the entire title and A has nothing left in himself. If this
be true, it cannot be said consistently with this proposition that
where B is the trustee of such an interest for the life of C, his
not terminate sooner even though the trust has been carried out and
brought to an end. Lewis v. Rees (1856) 3 K. & J. 132. But see Beamont
v. Salisbury (1854) 19 Beav. 198; Perry, Trusts sec. 319. In the case of
wills, the courts were always willing to give effect to the supposed inten-
tion of the testator, and to either enlarge or contract the legal title given
the trustee according to the needs of the particular trust. Gibson v. Mont-
fort, supra, note 46; Perry, Trusts, sec. 319.
47. Coniby v. McMichael (1851) 19 Ala. 747. See Perry, Trusts, sec-
tion 311, where it is stated that there must be a delivery of a chattel per-
sonal by the trustee before title will pass to the party entitled to the bene-
ficial use. Sed qu? See, infra, note 49 and text in connection therewith.
48. Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, section 807 ct seq and section 822.
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title as trustee ends with C's life. But again the rule is technical
and there is other authority, which appears to be better, allowing
a reversionary interest in all chattels not of a consumnimable na-
ture.4 9  It is therefore urged that a decision that the trustee's
title to personal property ends with the trust is proper.
While, as already noted, some authority denies that there
can be a reversionary interest in chattels, following a life interest
therein, the rule is practically uniform to the effect that personal
property can be limited over by will on the death of a so-called
life tenant. The limitation will take effect as an executory be-
quest.50 This being the case, most courts are free to hold that a
testamentary trustee's title will come to an end with the accom-
plishment of the trust.
It will occasionally -happen that land will be bargained and
sold to B and his heirs in trust for C and his heirs, and the deed
will operate by way of use and not to convey a legal title. 1  If
no duties as a trustee are imposed on B the question will be, will
B keep the title, or will it come to C without a legal conveyance?
The same problem will be met in every case where there is a
trust created which is passive and not within the operation of the
statute of uses. This will be the situation in all cases of uses upon
uses in land, and trusts of personal property, including trusts in
lease-hold interests. It would appear that in this type of case the
title is in the trustee and will remain there until conveyed away."2
While it will be the duty of the trustee to place the title in the
cestui que trust, still, as no statute serves to fulfill this duty, an
act of conveyance should be essential to bring about its per-
formance.
University of Missouri School of Law. JAMES LEWIS PARKS.
49. Gray, op. cit., sec. 842. Anonymous (1802) 2 Haywood (N. C.)
161; Eyres v. Faulkland (1697) 1 Salk. 231.
50. Manning's Case (1609) 8 Co. 94 b; Re Tritton (1889) 6 Morrell,
Bankruptcy Cases, 250.
51. See, supra, note 38.
52. See Ringrose v. Gleadall (1912) 121 Pac. (Cal. App.) 407; Wooley
v. Preston (1884) 82 Ky. 415; Sears v. Choate (1888) 146 Mass. 395; Hill
v. Hill (1911) 90 Neb. 43, 132 N. W. 738. See also Rector v. Dalby (1902)
98 Mo. App. 189, 71 S. W. 1078; Perry, Trusts, sec. 520.
